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Abstract 
Prior research concludes that stock price crash risk is primarily attributable to managers’ 
withholding of bad news from investors. We extend this literature by investigating whether 
crash risk can also occur when managers disclose additional information via non-GAAP 
reporting, which downplays reported bad news by re-directing investors’ attention to other, 
more positive aspects of performance. We find that the likelihood of crash risk is higher when 
managers have reported non-GAAP earnings more frequently during the past year. We also 
find that managers appear to use non-GAAP reporting as a substitute for the more common 
reason for crash risk in prior research–withholding bad news. Moreover, we find that the 
association between non-GAAP disclosure and crash risk increases in periods when managers 
are likely more aggressive in their non-GAAP reporting. Finally, we use a regulatory shock 
as a quasi-natural experiment to mitigate endogeneity concerns. 
Key words: Non-GAAP earnings, Stock price crash risk, Disclosure, Regulation 
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 We investigate the relation between non-GAAP reporting and stock price crash risk. 
The extant literature defines a stock price crash as an extreme drop in stock price and finds 
that these crashes frequently have severe effects on investors. A burgeoning literature has 
identified several firm and executive characteristics that predict a higher likelihood of stock 
price crashes, including reporting opacity, less conservative earnings, and CEO 
overconfidence (Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2016b; Kim and Zhang, 2016). This literature 
attributes crashes to managers’ ability to exploit their information advantage over investors 
by withholding bad news about firm performance. We examine whether crashes only occur 
when managers withhold information, or whether crash risk can also occur when managers 
disclose additional information about current performance beyond what is required by GAAP. 
Specifically, we study whether managers’ non-GAAP earnings disclosures influence crash 
risk. 
 Non-GAAP earnings are adjusted earnings numbers that exclude certain GAAP-
mandated earnings components. Managers can provide these alternative metrics to signal the 
relative importance of earnings components that managers choose to include, versus exclude, 
in calculating non-GAAP earnings (Gu and Chen, 2004; Hsu and Kross, 2011). Moreover, 
prior research indicates that investors find these alternative performance metrics to be more 
informative than GAAP earnings (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Bradshaw et al., 2018). 
However, critics of non-GAAP reporting have long questioned whether managers’ primary 
reason for disclosing adjusted earnings metrics is to refocus investors’ attention away from 
the negative aspects of firm performance. Moreover, prior research finds that managers can 
use non-GAAP earnings as a substitute for other forms of earnings management (Doyle et al., 
2013; Black et al., 2017). As a result, a stock price crash might occur not only when 
managers withhold bad news, but also when they choose to disclose additional information 
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about performance (through non-GAAP earnings measures) to divert investors’ attention 
from disclosed bad news and to instead focus their attention on other, more positive aspects 
of performance. This reasoning suggests that non-GAAP metrics could lead investors to 
discount certain negative aspects of GAAP earnings, over-value the firm, and subsequently 
experience a stock crash.  
 Prior research does not offer direct evidence on whether non-GAAP reporting is likely 
to increase or decrease crash risk. On the one hand, some researchers find that non-GAAP 
earnings generally provide investors with a better understanding of a firm’s underlying 
economics and aid in valuation (Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Gu and Chen, 2004). Further, 
recent research finds that managers’ non-GAAP adjustments increase the comparability of 
earnings metrics across firms (Black et al., 2018a), and that more comparable earnings are 
associated with lower crash risk (Kim et al., 2016a). On the other hand, prior research also 
finds that non-GAAP earnings can potentially mislead investors’ perceptions of firm 
performance. For example, (1) non-GAAP earnings tend to exceed their GAAP counterpart 
(e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002), (2) non-GAAP earnings increase the likelihood of meeting 
or beating market expectations (Black and Christensen, 2009; Barth et al., 2012; Doyle et al., 
2013), and (3) the items excluded in calculating non-GAAP earnings, which primarily 
represent expense items, are associated with future operating performance (e.g., Doyle et al., 
2003; Kolev et al., 2008). Thus, non-GAAP earnings could optimistically bias investors’ 
perceptions of firm value, and increase the likelihood of a stock price crash when the 
subsequent performance is not consistent with investors’ optimistic expectations.  
We investigate the relation between managers’ non-GAAP earnings disclosures and 
crash risk using a large sample of US firms with fiscal years ending between 2003 and 2015. 
Our non-GAAP disclosure measure focuses on the frequency with which managers disclose 
non-GAAP earnings to investors, which we measure as the percentage of firm-quarters in the 
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fiscal year in which managers disclose non-GAAP earnings. Since we are interested in 
whether non-GAAP reporting is associated with higher future crash risk, we examine the 
relation between the frequency of non-GAAP reporting during a given fiscal year and crash 
risk in the subsequent year. Following prior research (e.g., Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 
2016b), we use four empirical measures to capture crash risk: (1) an indicator for when a firm 
experiences an extreme negative weekly stock return, (2) the negative skewness of weekly 
stock returns, (3) the asymmetric volatility of positive and negative stock returns, and (4) a 
composite measure based on the three individual crash risk measures.  
Across all four crash risk measures, we find that crash risk is higher when managers 
disclose non-GAAP earnings more frequently in the previous year. For example, a one 
standard deviation increase in the frequency of non-GAAP reporting during the year leads to 
a 4% increase in the likelihood of an extreme negative weekly return (i.e., a crash) in the 
subsequent year.1 To further examine our evidence, we assert that if investors over-estimate a 
firm’s value because of their focus on non-GAAP earnings, our results should be attributable 
to observations where non-GAAP earnings paint a rosier picture of performance. Consistent 
with this assertion, the positive association between non-GAAP reporting frequency and 
future crash risk only exists when non-GAAP earnings exceed GAAP earnings (i.e., the firm 
makes income-increasing adjustments).  
Next, we examine whether non-GAAP reporting serves as a complement or a 
substitute for what prior research has traditionally viewed to be the primary reason for crash 
risk—the withholding of bad news through managing earnings. On the one hand, managers 
could use non-GAAP disclosure to inflate investors’ perceptions in conjunction with the 
                                                          
1 We find that the unconditional probability of having a crash in a year is 22%. As a result, the increase in a 
firm’s probability of having a crash due to a one standard deviation increase in the frequency of non-GAAP 
reporting is approximately 18% (4% divided by 22%) of the unconditional probability of having a crash. 
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withholding of bad news (complementary role).2 On the other hand, prior research finds that 
managers can use non-GAAP reporting to substitute for other forms of earnings management 
(Doyle et al., 2013; Black et al., 2017), suggesting that managers may prefer to influence 
investors’ perceptions by “backing out” the bad news in GAAP earnings through non-GAAP 
adjustments (substitutionary role). Consistent with managers using non-GAAP reporting as a 
substitute for withholding bad news, we find that the relation between non-GAAP reporting 
frequency and crash risk is concentrated among firms that are less likely to withhold bad 
news.  
Next, we examine whether the relation between non-GAAP reporting and crash risk is 
the result of managers’ aggressive non-GAAP reporting, or simply an artifact of non-GAAP 
reporting more generally. We begin by examining whether the non-GAAP reporting and 
crash risk relation is stronger in periods when managers are more likely to be aggressive in 
their reporting. We first examine this relation in periods of high investor sentiment. Brown et 
al. (2012) find that managers are more aggressive in their non-GAAP reporting during 
periods of high investor sentiment, likely because investors scrutinize managers’ adjustments 
less during these periods. We find that the relation between non-GAAP reporting and crash 
risk is significantly higher in periods of high investor sentiment. Next, we examine another 
common measure of aggressive non-GAAP reporting, the use of non-GAAP exclusions to 
meet analysts’ quarterly forecasts when GAAP earnings fall short of expectations (e.g., 
Bradshaw et al., 2018). Again, we find that the relation between non-GAAP reporting and 
crash risk is higher when non-GAAP earnings more frequently allow firms to report a 
positive earnings surprise.  
We also examine the relation between non-GAAP reporting and crash risk, 
conditional on managers’ incentives to use aggressive non-GAAP reporting to inflate stock 
                                                          
2 Prior research suggests that managers could use a complementary tool (e.g., manipulate the readability of 10-
Ks) in conjunction with the withholding of bad news to inflate investors’ perceptions (e.g., Kim et al., 2019). 
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price. We expect managers to have greater incentives to use aggressive non-GAAP reporting 
to inflate stock price when they have a higher potential to benefit from their actions. We 
consider two scenarios where managers are more likely to benefit from an inflated stock price: 
(1) when their compensation is more sensitive to stock price changes and (2) when they are 
more likely to engage in opportunistic insider sales. If managers are aggressive in their non-
GAAP reporting to inflate stock price, we expect the relation between non-GAAP reporting 
and crash risk to be more pronounced in these two scenarios. Our results are consistent with 
this expectation. 
We conduct several additional analyses, including a test that examines an exogenous 
shock to the quality of non-GAAP reporting (i.e., Regulation G).3 In particular, we examine a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) research design with propensity score matching between a 
treatment group and a control group around the enactment of Regulation G. We identify our 
treatment group as firms where Regulation G is most likely to improve the quality of firms’ 
non-GAAP exclusion choices, and our control group as firms where the regulation is less 
likely to affect the firms’ exclusion choices.4 As a result, we expect the decline in crash risk 
to be greater for the treatment group than for the control group after Regulation G. Our 
empirical results are consistent with this prediction. Our DiD design offers two key 
advantages. First, it rules out omitted trends that correlate with both non-GAAP reporting and 
crash risk in the treatment and control groups (e.g., certain omitted firm fundamentals). 
Second, it strengthens our inferences regarding the influence of non-GAAP reporting on 
                                                          
3 The SEC implemented Regulation G in early 2003, which mandates firms that publicly disclosures a non-
GAAP earnings number to provide a clearly understandable quantitative reconciliation of that number to the 
most directly comparable GAAP number. Firms must also present non-GAAP earnings in ways that do not 
mislead investors.  
4 Prior research finds that Regulation G improved the quality of non-GAAP reporting in the years immediately 
after its implementation (Heflin and Hsu 2008; Kolev et al. 2008). We thus conduct our DiD analysis using a 
four-year window centered on Regulation G. Using a relatively short-window in our DiD test can help mitigate 
the potential confounding effects that tend to be larger in a longer-window test (Heflin and Hsu 2008). We 
provide a detailed discussion of our DiD design in Section 6. 
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crash risk as we conduct our analysis around an exogenous shock to non-GAAP reporting 
quality using Regulation G.  
Finally, we provide additional insight into whether crashes among non-GAAP 
reporting firms have longer-run implications for investors. We find that non-GAAP reporting 
firms with subsequent crashes have a more negative annual stock return during the year of the 
crash (and more negative two- and three-year returns beginning in the crash year), relative to 
non-GAAP firms that do not experience a crash. These results indicate that the negative 
implications of crashes related to non-GAAP reporting are not simply short-term in nature 
(i.e., a crash is empirically identified based on a one-week price decline) but that these 
crashes expose investors to more sustained negative implications.  
Our analyses contribute to the extant literature in several ways. First, we extend the 
crash risk literature by identifying a new mechanism that influences crashes–the disclosure of 
additional information to investors that paints an overly optimistic perspective of firm 
performance. In contrast, researchers in the crash risk literature primarily attribute crashes to 
managers’ tendency to withhold bad news from investors. Our results suggest that managers 
view non-GAAP reporting as a substitute to the withholding of bad news and can use this 
perception management tool to positively influence investors’ assessments of firm 
performance.  
Second, we contribute to the non-GAAP earnings literature by providing evidence 
that managers’ non-GAAP earnings disclosures can expose investors to extreme negative 
economic outcomes, particularly in settings where managers are more likely to be aggressive 
in their reporting choices. This result is important for several reasons. First, prior studies 
provide little evidence on how non-GAAP information negatively affects investors’ welfare. 
The closest evidence indicates that investors under-price exclusions over long return 
windows (i.e., windows of at least one year) prior to Regulation G (e.g., Doyle et al., 2003). 
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However, more recent research indicates that investors no longer significantly misprice non-
GAAP earnings after this regulation (Zhang and Zheng, 2011). Thus, we extend the literature 
by providing evidence that (1) mispricing resulting from non-GAAP disclosure persists in the 
current reporting environment in certain scenarios, (2) the negative effects of non-GAAP 
reporting can occur over a very short time period via a “crash”, and (3) crashes related to 
non-GAAP reporting have a sustained negative consequence over a long-run window. 5 
Additionally, prior research highlights the need for alternative methods to assess the quality 
of non-GAAP metrics and how these metrics inform investors (Black et al., 2018b). We 
answer this call by examining crash risk, which has not been examined in prior non-GAAP 
studies.  
Finally, our results have implications for regulators, who have long expressed 
concerns about managers’ non-GAAP reporting. For example, the SEC expressed 
considerable concern about non-GAAP reporting in the early 2000s and implemented 
Regulation G in 2003 in an effort to protect investors from misleading non-GAAP metrics. 
The SEC’s interest piqued again in the recent decade as non-GAAP metrics became 
commonplace in capital markets (Bentley et al., 2018; Black et al., 2018b). 6 The extant 
literature, however, provides little evidence consistent with the SEC’s recent apprehension 
about these metrics. Using a sample spanning from 2003 to 2015 (i.e., post-Regulation G), 
we provide novel evidence (1) consistent with the SEC’s ongoing concern that non-GAAP 
reporting might mislead investors in certain settings and (2) on the type of exclusions that are, 
                                                          
5 Our focus on crashes is important because crashes expose investors to major downside losses over a very short 
period of time, while gradual losses across time allow investors to exit their position without much loss. Further, 
the first moment of the return distribution (i.e., average returns) (e.g., Doyle et al. 2003) cannot differentiate 
stocks with large and negative price drops within a short period of time (e.g., one week) from stocks with a 
steady price decline over a long period of time (e.g., one year or longer). Our results regarding the influence of 
non-GAAP reporting on crashes, together with the results regarding these crashes’ long-run consequences, 
provide a more complete picture on the effects of non-GAAP reporting on stock returns. 
6 For example, since 2010, the SEC (1) labeled non-GAAP metrics as a “fraud risk factor” (Leone, 2010), (2) 
formed a taskforce to scrutinize non-GAAP metrics (Rapoport, 2013), and (3) used comment letters and 
Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations to improve the quality of non-GAAP reporting (Black et al., 2018b; 
Gomez et al., 2018). 
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and are not, particularly concerning. These results answer Black et al.’s (2018b) call for 
evidence that helps reconcile the SEC’s concern about non-GAAP earnings potentially 
misleading investors, and the dearth of evidence in the literature that corroborates this 
concern in the more recent time period. 
 
2. Background and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Crash Risk 
 The crash risk literature builds upon agency theory, where corporate insiders maintain 
an information advantage over corporate stakeholders and use their advantage to hide bad 
news about the firm (Jin and Myers, 2006; Hutton et al., 2009).7 Because stakeholders are not 
aware of the accumulating bad news for an extended period of time, the firm’s stock return 
distribution does not reflect enough negative news and becomes asymmetric. At a certain 
point, corporate insiders are no longer willing or able to continue withholding bad news (i.e., 
they hit their abandonment option), and the stockpiled news enters the market all at once, 
leading to a stock price crash. 
 Stock crashes have significantly negative consequences for investors, whose exposure 
to these crashes is only mitigated through screening, as opposed to diversification (Sunder, 
2010).8 Thus, a growing body of research examines the relation between certain accounting 
properties and stock price crashes. Hutton et al.’s (2009) seminal research indicates that more 
opaque financial reports, measured by absolute value of discretionary operating accruals, are 
more likely to induce stock price crashes. Kim and Zhang (2014) provide additional evidence 
on the relation between financial reporting opacity and crash risk by examining different 
                                                          
7 Corporate insiders might choose to withhold bad news for a number of reasons, including career concerns, 
compensation, and litigation risk (Kothari et al., 2009). 
8 Crash risk only relates to investment losses, while risk of return refers to a dispersion of outcomes (i.e., 
uncertainty) that include both investment gains and losses. Although risk of return can be reduced through 
diversification, crash risk cannot be diversified away because risk-preferring behavior in the crash risk setting 
would simply relate to incurring more of a loss, as opposed to expecting a higher future return.  
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proxies of reporting opacity and expected crash risk. They find evidence consistent with more 
transparent financial reporting reducing expected crash risk.  
Other studies explore how different accounting properties affect stock price crashes. 
For example, Kim et al. (2011b) find that complex and opaque tax avoidance increases the 
probability of future stock price crashes, which they attribute to tax avoidance allowing 
managers to hide bad news. Kim and Zhang (2016) argue that conservatism in financial 
accounting facilitates the disclosure of bad news, and thus decreases the likelihood of future 
stock price crashes. Kim et al. (2016b) find that expected crash risk declines with financial 
statement comparability, consistent with comparable reporting practices reducing managers’ 
bad news hoarding. Finally, DeFond et al. (2015) examine the effects of accounting standards 
on crash risk, and find that mandatory IFRS adoption leads to a lower likelihood of crash risk 
for nonfinancial firms.  
In addition to examining the properties of financial accounting, other studies have 
examined how managerial characteristics associate with crash risk. For example, Kim et al. 
(2011a) find that the sensitivity of a CFO’s equity incentives is positively associated with 
future crash risk, while Kim et al. (2016b) find that firms with overconfident CEOs have a 
higher likelihood of future crashes. He (2015) finds that CEOs with larger inside debt have 
lower stock price crash risk. Finally, Hamm et al. (2018) examine how managers’ forward-
looking earnings guidance affects crash risk. They find a positive relation between optimistic 
forecasts and crash risk, consistent with managers withholding bad news from their forecasts 
and optimistically biasing investors’ perceptions of future firm performance.9  
 
                                                          
9 Although managers’ forecasts provide additional information to investors, stock crashes still occur from 
managers withholding bad news from these forecasts, in particular, optimistic forecasts (Hamm et al., 2018). 
Their evidence is consistent with managerial incentives, such as career concerns, motivating managers to issue 
good news guidance early but to withhold and delay the disclosure of bad news (e.g., Kothari et al., 2009). In 
contrast, we find that managers do not have to withhold bad news from GAAP earnings for stock crashes to 
occur. Instead, all investors receive information about firm performance through GAAP earnings and some 
firms provide additional information about that performance through non-GAAP earnings. 




2.2 Non-GAAP Earnings 
Managers frequently disclose non-GAAP earnings in their earnings announcements. 
These alternative performance metrics are not prepared in accordance with GAAP because 
the non-GAAP metrics exclude certain items that GAAP earnings require. Managers’ non-
GAAP exclusions primarily consist of certain special item adjustments, such as restructuring 
charges and impairments of goodwill, or recurring item adjustments, such as amortization of 
acquired intangible assets and stock-based compensation (Whipple, 2015; Black et al., 
2018a).10  
Managers assert that non-GAAP earnings are informative because they provide 
investors with a performance metric that better depicts core operations. Several studies 
provide evidence consistent with this assertion. For example, managers most commonly 
exclude special items when calculating non-GAAP earnings (Black et al., 2018b), and 
managers can exclude these items even when the exclusion lowers the non-GAAP metric 
(Curtis et al., 2014). Managers also appear to vary their non-GAAP calculations over time, 
and across firms, for informative reasons (Black et al., 2018b), and their non-GAAP metrics 
can be particularly informative when firms report a GAAP loss (Leung and Veenman, 2018). 
Finally, investors find non-GAAP metrics to be informative and focus more on these metrics 
than on their GAAP counterparts (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002; Bhattacharya et al., 2003; 
Bradshaw et al., 2018).  
Non-GAAP earnings, however, have long faced the criticism that they positively bias 
investors’ perceptions by excluding negative aspects of firm performance. For example, the 
former SEC Chief Accountant, Lynn Turner, famously characterized early non-GAAP 
                                                          
10 Both managers and analysts play a role in non-GAAP reporting (Bentley et al., 2018), with (1) analysts 
forecasting firm performance on a non-GAAP basis and demanding this information from managers, and (2) 
managers disclosing non-GAAP earnings to provide insight into how they evaluate firm performance, and 
analysts receiving information about possible non-GAAP adjustments from managers (CAQ, 2018). 
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reporting practices as “everything but bad stuff” (Dow Jones, 2001). The tenor of this 
criticism carries into the current reporting environment. Black et al. (2018b) find that, among 
their sample of S&P 500 firms, nearly 70% of non-GAAP reporters disclose a metric that 
exceeds GAAP earnings. Prior research also finds that (1) non-GAAP exclusions can map 
into future firm performance (e.g., Doyle et al., 2003; Kolev et al., 2008), which is 
inconsistent with the assertion that these items are transitory or non-cash in nature, (2) non-
GAAP earnings can allow firms to meet market expectations (e.g., Doyle et al., 2013; 
Bradshaw et al., 2018), and (3) investors under-priced exclusions prior to Regulation G (e.g., 
Doyle et al., 2003). However, even though prior research indicates that non-GAAP earnings 
can be used for non-informative reasons, there is little evidence that these metrics have 
negative economic consequences in the time period after Regulation G.  
Finally, it is important to note that non-GAAP earnings have become commonplace in 
capital markets. Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) were the first to cast light on the increasing 
popularity of non-GAAP earnings during the 1990s. This increasing popularity has generally 
continued since that time.11 For example, Black et al. (2018b) document that 71% of S&P 
500 firms report an annual non-GAAP metric in 2014. The SEC has long expressed concern 
that managers’ non-GAAP metrics could mislead investors, and the SEC enacted Regulation 
G in 2003 to increase the transparency and quality of non-GAAP earnings numbers. Although 
non-GAAP earnings became more transparent and less biased after the regulation (e.g., 
Heflin and Hsu, 2008; Kolev et al., 2008; Zhang and Zheng, 2011), aggressive non-GAAP 
reporting persists (e.g., Curtis et al., 2014; Bradshaw et al., 2018). More recently, the SEC 
has used comment letters and Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations in an effort to 
improve the quality of non-GAAP information (Black et al., 2018b; Gomez et al., 2018). In 
addition to regulators, the FASB questions whether non-GAAP information sends a signal 
                                                          
11 The use of non-GAAP earnings declined after Regulation G in 2003 (Heflin and Hsu, 2008), however, the 
reporting practice has since rebounded (Brown et al., 2012).  
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about ways to improve the quality of GAAP information (e.g., Linsmeier, 2016; Golden, 
2017), while the PCAOB questions the role of auditors in auditing non-GAAP metrics 
(PCAOB, 2016). Needless to say, regulators and standard setters have expressed a substantial 
interest in non-GAAP earnings in recent years. 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
 The crash risk literature primarily views stock price crashes as being the result of 
managers withholding bad news about firm performance. We examine whether another way 
that crashes can occur is through investors having access to additional information about 
current performance that biases their perceptions of the firm. We examine this question using 
non-GAAP earnings because (1) they are the most commonly used alternative performance 
metric in capital markets (Audit Analytics, 2018), (2) prior research finds that managers use 
non-GAAP earnings as a substitute to other forms of earnings management (Doyle et al., 
2013; Black et al., 2017), and (3) critics of non-GAAP earnings argue that they positively 
bias investors’ perceptions of firm performance, which aligns with the underlying reason for 
crash risk. In addition, investors care about non-GAAP earnings and find them more 
informative than GAAP earnings when pricing firm performance (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; 
Bradshaw et al., 2018).  
 Ex ante, it is unclear whether non-GAAP earnings increase or decrease crash risk. On 
the one hand, non-GAAP earnings better capture firms’ core operations and are more value 
relevant for investors than GAAP earnings (Brown and Sivakumar, 2003; Gu and Chen, 
2004). Moreover, Black et al. (2018a) find that non-GAAP earnings is a more comparable 
earnings metric across peer firms, and Kim et al. (2016a) find that more comparable earnings 
are associated with lower crash risk. Thus, non-GAAP earnings might allow investors to 
more accurately value the firm, and mitigate the chances of a crash. On the other hand, critics 
of non-GAAP earnings argue that these metrics present an overly optimistic picture of the 
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firm by purging out negative aspects of performance. Consistent with this view, prior 
research indicates that managers can use non-GAAP reporting for non-informative reasons 
(e.g., Doyle et al., 2003; Barth et al., 2012). As a result, non-GAAP earnings may create an 
illusion of good performance for investors, leading them to inflate stock price. However, once 
investors realize they have overvalued the firm by a large margin, the stock price will likely 
crash. We state our first hypothesis in alternate form as follows:  
H1: There is a positive relation between non-GAAP reporting frequency and stock 
price crash risk.  
Next, we examine whether non-GAAP reporting serves as a complement or a 
substitute to withholding bad news, the traditional method that contributes to crashes. Non-
GAAP reporting could play a complementary role if managers use this disclosure practice in 
addition to withholding bad news to influence investors’ perceptions. In contrast, non-GAAP 
reporting could play a substitutionary role if managers prefer using this disclosure practice 
over withholding bad news (in mandatorily reported GAAP earnings) to influence investors’ 
perceptions. This substitutionary role is consistent with prior evidence that managers use non-
GAAP reporting to substitute for other forms of earnings management in certain scenarios 
(Doyle et al., 2013; Black et al., 2017). To investigate whether non-GAAP reporting serves as 
a complement or a substitute to withholding bad news, we examine the relation between non-
GAAP reporting and crash risk conditional on the extent to which managers withhold bad 
news from investors. If non-GAAP reporting is a complement (substitute) for withholding 
bad news, we expect the non-GAAP reporting and crash risk relation to concentrate among 
firms with a high (low) level of bad news withholding. We state our second hypothesis in two 
alternate forms as follows:  
H2a: The relation between non-GAAP reporting and crash risk is higher among firms 
with a high level of bad news withholding (complementary role). 
 
H2b: The relation between non-GAAP reporting and crash risk is higher among firms 
with a low level of bad news withholding (substitutionary role). 




3. Variable Measurement and Research Design 
3.1 Variable Measurement: Crash Risk 
Following prior research, we examine four measures of crash risk (e.g., Hutton et al., 
2009; Kim et al., 2011a, b). Because all four measures are based on a firm’s weekly returns, 
we first estimate the following model to ensure that our weekly return estimates capture firm-
specific factors, as opposed to market-wide factors:  
rj,ω = αj + β1,jrm,ω-2 + β2,jrm,ω-1 + β3,jrm,ω + β4,jrm,ω+1 + β5,jrm,ω+2 + εj,ω, (1) 
where rj,ω is the return for firm j in week ω, and rm,ω is the value-weighted CRSP return in 
week ω. For each firm and fiscal year, we estimate weekly returns throughout a 12-month 
return window that ends three months after firm i’s fiscal year end. We define the firm’s 
specific weekly return (Wj,ω) as the natural log of 1 + εj,ω.  
Our first measure of crash risk (Crash) is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm 
has at least one weekly return falling 3.2 standard deviations or more below the mean firm-
specific weekly return in fiscal year t + 1. Similar to prior studies (e.g., Kim et al., 2011a, b), 
we focus on returns that are at least 3.2 standard deviations below the mean because they 
identify extreme negative returns, consistent with the notion of a stock crash. Our second 
crash risk measure is negative return skewness (NSkewness), which captures the amount of 
negative skewness in a firm’s weekly stock returns during the year. Our third crash risk 
measure is the natural logarithm of DuVol (LnDuVol), which represents the asymmetric 
volatility of weekly stock returns over the year. We measure DuVol using the ratio of the 
standard deviation of weekly returns (Wj,ω) that are below the firm’s mean specific weekly 
return for the year to the standard deviation of weekly returns that are above the firm’s mean 
weekly return for the year. Finally, because the three individual crash risk measures proxy for 
the construct of crash risk in different ways, they inevitably capture some non-overlapping 
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features of the construct of crash risk. Therefore, we also use a composite measure of crash 
risk (Crash Composite) based on a principal component analysis of the three individual crash 
risk measures (Crash, NSkewness, and LnDuVol). This composite measure extracts the 
commonality across the three individual measures and reduces measurement error in the 
proxy. Across all four crash risk measures, higher values represent greater crash risk. 
3.2 Research Design 
We test our hypothesis, that there is a positive relation between non-GAAP reporting 
frequency and stock price crash risk, using the following regression: 
Crash Riski,t+1 = a0 + a1NonGaapFreqi,t + a2NSkewnessi,t + a3Sizei,t + a4MTBi,t 
+ a5Leveragei,t + a6ROAi,t+1 + a7Returni,t + a8Sigmai,t   
+ a9ChgTurnoveri,t + a10DisAccuralsi,t + a11SqAbAccrualsi,t    
+ ∑γtYeart + ∑wjIndj + ei,t.  
 
(2) 
As previously discussed, we use four different measures of crash risk (Crash, NSkewness, 
LnDuVol, and Crash Composite). When Crash is the dependent variable, we estimate the 
model using a logistic regression. Otherwise, we estimate the model using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions. NonGaapFreq is the percentage of quarters where managers 
disclose non-GAAP earnings in their earnings announcement during fiscal year t. 12  A 
significantly positive coefficient for NonGaapFreq (a1) indicates that more frequent non-
GAAP earnings disclosure is associated with higher crash risk in the subsequent year. In 
contrast, an insignificant (significantly negative) coefficient for NonGaapFreq indicates that 
non-GAAP disclosure frequency is not (negatively) associated with crash risk in the 
subsequent year. 
We also control for variables identified in prior research that might affect a firm’s 
future crash risk. In particular, we control for the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly 
returns in fiscal year t (NSkewness). We control for firm size (Size) (Hutton et al., 2009), 
                                                          
12 We identify non-GAAP earnings using data available from Bentley et al. (2018). The managerial non-GAAP 
dataset is publicly available at the following website: https://sites.google.com/view/kurthgee/data. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3454799 
16 
 
market-to-book ratio (MTB) (Chen et al., 2001), leverage (Leverage) (Kim and Zhang, 2016), 
accounting performance (ROA) (Hutton et al., 2009; Kim and Zhang, 2016), and average 
firm-specific weekly return (Return) (Hutton et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011a, b). We also 
control for volatility in firm-specific weekly returns (Sigma) (Chen et al., 2001), changes in 
investor belief heterogeneity using stock turnover (ChgTurnover) (Chen et al., 2001), and 
measures of information opaqueness (DisAccruals and SqDisAccruals) (Hutton et al., 2009). 
Finally, we include year (Yeart) and industry (Indj) fixed effects in our model to control for 
time-invariant and industry-invariant unobservable effects based on the Fama-French 48 
industry classification. We estimate the model using robust standard errors, which we cluster 
by firm. We winsorize all control variables at the top and bottom one percent of the sample.13 
We also use a cross-sectional analysis to examine a setting where we expect the non-
GAAP earnings and crash risk relation to be larger. In particular, if non-GAAP earnings lead 
to future crashes, we expect these crashes to occur because non-GAAP earnings positively 
bias investors’ perceptions of firm performance. Thus, we expect that investors’ optimistic 
bias is larger when non-GAAP metrics have income increasing adjustments, as opposed to 
income decreasing adjustments, resulting in a non-GAAP metric that exceeds GAAP earnings. 
We test this prediction using the following equation:  
Crash Riski,t+1 = a0 + a1NonGaapFreqNG>Gi,t + a2NonGaapFreqNG<Gi,t  
 + ∑anControls + ∑γtYeart + ∑wjIndj + ei,t,  
 
(3) 
where Equation 3 is similar to Equation 2, except that we use NonGaapFreqNG>G and 
NonGaapFreqNG<G to measure non-GAAP reporting frequency. NonGaapFreqNG>G 
represents the percentage of firm quarters in a fiscal year with a non-GAAP metric that 
exceeds GAAP earnings (i.e., net non-GAAP adjustments increase income). In contrast, 
NonGaapFreqNG<G represents the percentage of firm quarters in a fiscal year with a non-
                                                          
13 Following prior research, we do not winsorize the crash risk variables because they capture the extreme tails 
of the return distribution (e.g., Kim et al., 2011a, b). Thus, winsorizing these variables would modify the values 
that are specifically relevant to our study. 
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GAAP metric that is less than GAAP earnings (i.e., net non-GAAP adjustments decrease 
income). To measure total non-GAAP exclusions, we follow prior research (e.g., Bentley et 
al., 2018) and use the difference between managers’ non-GAAP EPS and GAAP EPS.14 A 
significantly larger coefficient on NonGaapFreqNG>G (a1) than NonGaapFreqNG<G (a2) would 
be consistent with our expectation that optimistic non-GAAP reporting is more likely to lead 
to future crashes. Crash Risk and Controls are as previously defined.  
 
4. Sample Construction and Empirical Results 
4.1 Sample Construction and Descriptive Evidence 
To construct our sample, we first identify all firms from the Compustat, CRSP, and 
I/B/E/S universe with fiscal years from 2003 to 2015. We begin our sample in 2003 because 
it is the first year in which large scale data about managers’ non-GAAP reporting begins 
(Bentley et al., 2018). We obtain accounting data from Compustat Quarterly files, stock price 
and return data from CRSP daily files, and data about managers’ non-GAAP reporting from 
the publicly available Bentley et al. (2018) dataset. In addition, following prior crash risk 
studies (e.g., Hutton et al., 2009), we require that (1) total assets and book values of equity 
for each firm be greater than zero, (2) that a firm must have at least 26 weekly returns for 
each fiscal year, and (3) that firms are not in financial and utilities industries. Finally, we 
require non-missing GAAP earnings in Compustat and data on whether managers report non-
GAAP earnings. Since we calculate the frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosure during 
the fiscal year, we require all firm-quarters during the year to be non-missing. Our final 
sample consists of 30,336 firm-year observations. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. The mean values of our crash risk measures 
(Crash, NSkewness, LnDuVol) are consistent with the values found in the extant literature 
                                                          
14  We define GAAP EPS as Compustat’s earnings per share before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations. 
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(Kim and Zhang, 2016; Kim et al., 2019). For example, Crash is 0.223, suggesting that just 
over 22% of firm-years in our sample experience at least one crash week during fiscal year 
t+1.15 Across the sample, 26.1% of fiscal quarters have a non-GAAP metric during the fiscal 
year.16 We find that 21.1% of quarters have a non-GAAP metric greater than GAAP earnings 
(NonGaapFreqNG>G > 0), while 5.0% of quarters have a non-GAAP metric less than GAAP 
earnings (NonGaapFreqNG<G > 0). The control variables are also generally consistent with the 
extant literature.  
Because the overall sample includes firms that only report GAAP earnings, we also 
examine our variables of interest specifically for firm-years with non-GAAP reporting (i.e., 
NonGaapFreq > 0). The untabulated results indicate that 60% of fiscal quarters for these non-
GAAP firms have a non-GAAP metric. In addition, 48% of quarters have non-GAAP 
earnings greater than GAAP earnings (NonGaapFreqNG>G > 0), while 12% of quarters have 
non-GAAP earnings smaller than GAAP earnings (NonGaapFreqNG<G > 0).  
Next, we provide descriptive evidence on how Crash varies with non-GAAP 
reporting frequency (NonGaapFreq). Panel A of Figure 1 indicates that Crash monotonically 
increases with non-GAAP reporting frequency, which provide descriptive evidence consistent 
with crash risk increasing as managers more commonly disclose non-GAAP metrics to 
investors. In Panel B, we partition non-GAAP reporting frequency based on whether a non-
GAAP metric is greater than GAAP earnings (i.e., NonGaapFreqNG>G) or less than GAAP 
earnings (i.e., NonGaapFreqNG<G). We find that the monotonic increase between Crash and 
non-GAAP reporting frequency only exists for the NonGaapFreqNG>G setting, while there is 
not a discernible pattern between Crash and non-GAAP reporting frequency for the 
NonGaapFreqNG<G setting. 
                                                          
15 The untabulated mean (median) weekly return (rj,ω) of firms during their crash weeks is -22.7% (-19.7%). 
16 More specifically, 17,123 observations do not report non-GAAP earnings in any of the four fiscal quarters, 
while 4,346 (2,620) [2,849] {3,389} observations report non-GAAP earnings in 1 (2) [3] {4} of the fiscal 
quarters. 
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4.2 Primary Analyses 
4.2.1 H1: Non-GAAP reporting and crash risk 
Table 2 presents the results from estimating Equation 2, where the dependent variable 
is Crash, NSkewness, LnDuVol, and Crash Composite across the four columns. In each 
specification, we find that the coefficient on NonGaapFreq is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating that more frequent non-GAAP reporting is associated with higher 
future crash risk. These results corroborate our first hypothesis (H1), and formally reject the 
null hypothesis of no relation between non-GAAP reporting frequency and crash risk. The 
magnitude of the relation is also significant. For example, column 1 suggests that in a logistic 
regression estimation, a one-standard-deviation increase in NonGaapFreq leads to a 4% 
increase in the likelihood of an extreme negative return (i.e., a crash) in the subsequent year. 
Given that Table 1 shows the unconditional probability of having a crash in a year is 22%, the 
economic effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in NonGaapFreq is approximately 18% 
(4% divided by 22%) of the unconditional probability of having a crash in a year. This effect 
on crash probability is just below the effect from a one-standard-deviation increase in accrual 
manipulation (DisAccruals; 6%), which is a common measure used in the literature to proxy 
for managers’ opaque disclosures, and one of the most important factors to contribute to 
crash risk (e.g., Hutton et al., 2009).  
We also find that the sign of the coefficients for the control variables and other known 
determinants of crash risk are largely consistent with prior research. For example, in column 
1, our results indicate that crash risk is higher for firms with more negative return skewness 
(NSkewness), larger firms (Size), and growth firms (MTB), while it is lower for firms with 
better concurrent operating performance (ROA). We also find that firms with larger returns 
(Return), higher change in turnover (ChgTurnover), and more opaque disclosure 
(DisAccruals) have greater crash risk. Overall, our results suggest that managers’ non-GAAP 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3454799 
20 
 
reporting is a significantly positive predictor of crash risk, even after controlling for other 
known determinants of crash risk.   
Table 3 presents the results of estimating Equation 3, where we categorize non-GAAP 
reporting frequency based on the percentage of fiscal quarters where the net non-GAAP 
adjustments result in a non-GAAP metric that either exceeds GAAP earnings 
(NonGaapFreqNG>G) or is less than GAAP earnings (NonGaapFreqNG<G). Across all four 
columns, we find that the coefficient on NonGaapFreqNG>G is significantly positive, 
consistent with crash risk being larger when non-GAAP earnings are more frequently higher 
than GAAP earnings throughout the year. An F-test between the NonGaapFreqNG>G and 
NonGaapFreqNG<G coefficients indicates that the relation between non-GAAP reporting 
frequency and crash risk is more positive when non-GAAP earnings exceed GAAP earnings. 
These results are consistent with the descriptive evidence presented in Figure 1 and indicate 
that crash risk is higher when non-GAAP earnings paint a rosier picture of performance than 
GAAP earnings.17 
4.2.2 H2: Non-GAAP reporting, crash risk, and withholding bad news 
Since we find evidence consistent with managers using non-GAAP earnings to 
positively influence investors’ perceptions, we next examine whether managers view non-
GAAP reporting as a complement or substitute to withholding bad news. To examine this 
question, we re-examine the association between non-GAAP reporting frequency and crash 
risk using Equation 3, and we partition the sample based on firms that have a high versus low 
level of bad news withholding. We follow prior research (e.g., Hutton et al., 2009) and use 
                                                          
17 In untabulated analyses, we further partition the frequency of income increasing non-GAAP reporting (i.e., 
NonGaapFreqNG>G) into the frequency of special item exclusions and the frequency of other item exclusions. 
Special items are transitory items reported by Compustat. Other items consist of recurring earnings components 
or transitory items that Compustat does not report as special items. We do not find evidence that the relation 
between crash risk and non-GAAP reporting statistically differs across these two exclusion categories. This 
result is perhaps not surprising because (1) other item exclusions became less aggressive after Regulation G 
(Heflin and Hsu, 2008; Kolev et al., 2008), and (2) special item exclusions became more aggressive after 
Regulation G (Kolev et al., 2008). 
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discretionary accruals as a proxy for the extent to which managers withhold bad news from 
investors. We partition our sample into terciles based on discretionary accruals (DisAccruals), 
and define firms in the lowest (highest) tercile as the firms that have a low (high) level of bad 
news withholding. If non-GAAP reporting is a substitute (complement) for withholding bad 
news, we expect the relation between non-GAAP reporting and crash risk to be higher in the 
subsample with the lowest (highest) discretionary accruals. If managers do not jointly 
consider non-GAAP reporting and withholding bad news as perception management tools, 
we expect to find evidence of the relation between non-GAAP reporting and crash risk across 
both the high and low accrual terciles. 
We present our results in Table 4. Across all four crash risk measures, we find that the 
positive association between income increasing non-GAAP reporting (NonGaapFreqNG>G) 
and future crash risk is concentrated among firms with a low level of bad news withholding. 
In contrast, we do not find evidence of a relation between these exclusions and crash risk for 
firms with a high level of bad news withholding. Moreover, we find that the coefficient on 
NonGaapFreqNG>G is significantly larger for firms with a low level of bad news withholding 
than for firms with a high level of bad news withholding. These results are consistent with 
H2b as opposed to H2a. That is, our evidence is consistent with managers viewing non-
GAAP reporting as a substitute for withholding bad news to optimistically influence investors’ 
perceptions.  
 
5. Managerial Incentives, Aggressive Non-GAAP Reporting, and Crash Risk 
We next examine whether the relation between crash risk and the frequency of income 
increasing exclusions is the result of managers’ aggressive non-GAAP reporting, or simply 
an artifact of non-GAAP reporting more generally (e.g., investors misuse informative non-
GAAP disclosures). To explore this question, we conduct two sets of analyses. In the first set 
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of analyses, we examine whether the relation between non-GAAP reporting and crash risk is 
stronger in time periods when managers are more likely aggressive in their non-GAAP 
reporting. In the second set of analyses, we examine whether this relation is stronger for 
managers with greater incentives to inflate stock price, which might motivate them to use 
aggressive non-GAAP reporting. Similar to our analyses in Table 4, we use Equation 3 and 
partition the sample for each analysis into terciles based on the estimated level of aggressive 
reporting or incentive to inflate stock price. We then compare the non-GAAP reporting and 
crash risk relation across the top and bottom terciles. We present the results for each of the 
analyses in Table 5, where we provide evidence for our main variable of interest 
(NonGaapFreqNG>G).18  
5.1 Investor Sentiment and Meeting Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts 
We first examine the relation between non-GAAP reporting and crash risk across time 
periods with varying levels of aggressive non-GAAP reporting. Prior research finds that 
managers are more aggressive in their non-GAAP reporting when sentiment is high (Brown 
et al., 2012), consistent with investors being less rigorous in their scrutiny of non-GAAP 
reporting in optimistic periods. Thus, we expect the relation between non-GAAP reporting 
frequency and crash risk to concentrate in periods of high investor sentiment. To examine this 
expectation, we obtain the investor sentiment index data from Jeffrey Wurgler’s website.19 
We then partition the sample based on the magnitude of the average sentiment over the fiscal 
year t (MktSent), and classify observations in the highest (lowest) tercile of the sample 
distribution as the high (low) sentiment group. In Panel A of Table 5, we find that the 
coefficient on NonGaapFreqNG>G is significantly positive for the high sentiment group across 
all four crash risk measures. In contrast, the NonGaapFreqNG>G coefficient is insignificant 
across the crash risk measures for the low sentiment group. We also find that the differences 
                                                          
18 To prevent Table 5 from becoming unwieldy, we suppress the other variables in Equation 3. 
19 The data is available at http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/. 
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in the NonGaapFreqNG>G coefficients between the high and low sentiment groups are 
significant at conventional levels across our crash risk measures. Thus, the relation between 
non-GAAP reporting frequency and future crash risk is stronger when investor sentiment is 
high, consistent with our conjecture.  
Another common proxy for aggressive non-GAAP reporting is when non-GAAP 
earnings allow a firm to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts, while GAAP earnings fall short of 
expectations. Following Bradshaw et al. (2018), we identify quarters where managers’ non-
GAAP earnings meet analysts’ street earnings forecasts (I/B/E/S variable EPS), while their 
GAAP earnings miss analysts’ GAAP earnings forecasts (I/B/E/S variable GPS). We then 
calculate the percentage of quarters during the year where this scenario occurs (FreqMBE) 
and classify observations in the highest (lowest) tercile of the sample distribution as the high 
(low) FreqMBE group. In Panel B of Table 5, we find that the coefficient on 
NonGaapFreqNG>G for the high tercile group is at least marginally significant across our 
crash risk measures. In contrast, NonGaapFreqNG>G is not significant across the crash risk 
measures for the low tercile group. Moreover, when we compare the coefficients for 
NonGaapFreqNG>G across the high and low tercile groups, we find marginally significant 
evidence that the coefficient is greater in the high tercile group than in the low tercile group 
for each of our crash risk measures.  
Overall, the evidence in Panels A and B of Table 5 is consistent with the relation 
between non-GAAP reporting frequency and crash risk being higher in periods when non-
GAAP reporting is likely more aggressive. 
5.2 Sensitivity of Compensation to Share Price Changes, and Insider Trading 
 Next, we examine whether the relation between non-GAAP reporting frequency and 
crash risk is higher for managers who have a greater incentive to inflate stock price, which 
provides them with the opportunity to benefit from inflating firm value. In this set of analyses, 
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we consider two settings where managers might have varying incentives to inflate stock 
prices: (i) managers’ compensation sensitivity to changes in stock price, and (ii) insider 
trading.  
In our first setting, we posit that managers with high compensation sensitivity to 
changes in stock price will have a greater incentive to use aggressive non-GAAP reporting to 
inflate stock prices. If this is the case, we expect the relation between non-GAAP reporting 
and crash risk to be stronger for managers with compensation that is more sensitive to 
changes in stock price. To test this conjecture, we partition our sample into terciles based on 
the sensitivity of managers’ compensation plans to changes in stock price. We measure 
compensation sensitivity based on Delta, measured as the minimum level of the 
compensation sensitivity (i.e., the dollar increase in an executive’s wealth for a 1% increase 
in stock price) among the executives available in Execucomp database of fiscal year t. 
Consistent with our conjecture, our results in Panel C of Table 5 reveal that this relation for 
each of the crash risk measures is (1) significant in the high tercile, (2) insignificant in the 
low tercile, and (3) significantly higher in the high tercile than in the low tercile. 
In our second setting, we posit that managers who engage in more opportunistic 
insider sales have a greater incentive to inflate stock prices through aggressive non-GAAP 
reporting. Thus, we expect the relation between non-GAAP reporting frequency and crash 
risk to be stronger when manager engage in more opportunistic insider sales prior to the year 
experiencing the crash risk. To test this conjecture, we partition our sample into terciles based 
on the amount of opportunistic insider sales in year t (OpptunSales). We measure 
opportunistic insider sales following Cohen et al. (2012), which focuses on the non-routine 
insider sales transactions made by a firm’s executives. In contrast, routine sales likely capture 
personal liquidity or diversification motives rather than the realization of information 
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advantage leading to negative future stock performance.20 Consistent with our conjecture, our 
results in Panel D of Table 5 indicate that this relation for each of the crash risk measures is 
significant in the high tercile group and insignificant in the low tercile group. Additionally, 
the coefficient in the high tercile group is significantly greater than in the low tercile group. 
In total, the results in this subsection are consistent with incentives to inflate stock price 
exacerbating the non-GAAP reporting and crash risk relation, indicating that this relation 
concentrates in scenarios when managers have a higher potential to benefit from aggressive 
non-GAAP reporting. 
 
6. Additional Analyses 
6.1 Robustness Checks 
6.1.1 Controlling for additional factors that affect crash risk 
In untabulated analyses, we also examine the relation between non-GAAP reporting 
frequency and future crash risk after controlling for several other factors that prior crash risk 
studies find as affecting crash risk. In particular, we consider accounting conservatism (Kim 
and Zhang, 2016), corporate tax avoidance (Kim et al., 2011b), CEO overconfidence (Kim et 
al., 2016b), accounting comparability (Kim et al., 2016a), financial reporting complexity 
(Kim et al., 2019), product market competition (Li and Zhan, 2018), and frequency of 
management earnings guidance (Hamm et al., 2018). Consistent with non-GAAP earnings 
having explanatory power for future crash risk over and above other known factors, we find 
                                                          
20 Specifically, we follow Cohen et al. (2012) and designate an insider’s sales on a stock in a particular month as 
either opportunistic or routine sales according to the insider’s past history of trades. In a given firm-year, the 
Cohen et al. (2012) method identifies three types of insider sales: routine, opportunistic, and unclassified. 
Unclassified sales are made by some insiders who fail to sell at least once in each of the three preceding years. 
We exclude these unclassified sales in our tests. 
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that the relation between non-GAAP reporting frequency and future crash risk remains 
significant.21  
6.1.2 Street earnings and crash risk 
 As an additional analysis, we re-examine our main analyses using I/B/E/S to identify 
non-GAAP metrics. As previously discussed, our primary analyses are based on managerial 
non-GAAP reporting because the SEC is specifically interested in managers’ non-GAAP 
metrics. Additionally, the notion of managers’ providing investors with non-GAAP earnings 
(i.e., addition information) is more symmetric with the traditional argument that crash risk 
occurs through managers’ withholding bad news. However, prior studies on non-GAAP 
earnings also focus on street earnings provided by analysts (i.e., non-GAAP metrics that 
analysts use to assess performance), or namely I/B/E/S actual earnings, and use street 
earnings to proxy for managerial non-GAAP earnings (e.g., Doyle et al., 2003; Heflin and 
Hsu, 2008). Examining the association between street earnings and crash risk is important for 
at least two reasons. First, prior research indicates that the market pays particular attention to 
street earnings (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Marques, 2006) and that analysts help filter out 
managers’ aggressive non-GAAP reporting (Bentley et al., 2018). Thus, it is interesting to 
examine whether the relation between non-GAAP reporting and crash risk remains when 
examining street earnings. Second, using street earnings also allows us to extend our 
sampling period to the pre-Regulation G period (i.e., before 2003), which allows us to 
examine the effect of an exogenous shock (i.e., Regulation G) to non-GAAP reporting quality 
and mitigate concerns regarding endogeneity in our main results.22  
We begin by examining whether the results from our primary analyses generalize to 
street earnings. Specifically, we repeat our Table 3 analysis using the analyst-based non-
                                                          
21 We do not include these additional variables in our primary analyses because their data requirements overly 
restrict our sample and lower our overall testing power.  
22 As previously discussed, the managerial non-GAAP reporting data from Bentley et al. (2018) is only available 
for periods after Regulation G (i.e., 2003 and onward). 
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GAAP metric (i.e., street earnings). To facilitate comparison with our earlier results, we use 
the same sample period as in our earlier analyses (i.e., 2003-2015), however, untabulated 
results indicate that the inferences are similar if we extend our sample period back to 1994. 
Columns 1-4 of Table 6 present the results. Consistent with our primary analyses 
based on managerial data, we find a significantly positive relation between the frequency of 
analysts’ non-GAAP reporting (particularly income-increasing non-GAAP reporting) and 
future crash risk. Thus, our primary inferences regarding managers’ non-GAAP reporting 
also generalize to analysts’ metrics. In untabulated analyses, we also partition the non-GAAP 
reporting variables based on the extent to which managers and analysts agree and disagree in 
their non-GAAP reporting because prior research finds that managers’ reporting is more 
aggressive than analysts’ reporting (e.g., Barth et al., 2012; Bentley et al., 2018). Our results 
indicate that the relation between non-GAAP reporting frequency and crash risk holds in 
scenarios where managers and analysts agree in their non-GAAP reporting, but not when they 
differ. One potential explanation for these results is that investors are more sceptical of non-
GAAP reporting when they receive conflicting signals from managers and analysts, and are 
therefore less likely to misprice the firm. However, it is important to note that managers and 
analysts are much more likely to agree in their reporting than disagree, thus, another 
explanation for our results might be due to the power of our analyses. 
6.1.3 Analyses of potential endogeneity 
Our primary analyses find evidence of a positive relation between non-GAAP 
reporting frequency and future crash risk, with this relation being due to non-GAAP earnings 
with income increasing exclusions. Next, we address the alternative explanation that our 
results are endogenous and due to unobservable firm characteristics that associate with non-
GAAP reporting frequency and future crash risk. We first note, however, that our results 
from Tables 3-5, where the relation between non-GAAP reporting frequency and crash risk is 
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concentrated in low bad news withholding firms and in scenarios where managers are 
incentivized to aggressively report non-GAAP earnings, help to mitigate concerns that our 
documented relation is endogenous since the unobservable firm characteristic would also 
need to vary across each of these scenarios.   
To further address the potential endogeneity concern, we use a difference-in-
differences (DiD) research design based on a matched sample and centered on Regulation G. 
Prior research provides evidence that Regulation G improved the quality of non-GAAP 
reporting (e.g., Heflin and Hsu, 2008; Kolev et al., 2008), with the regulation specifically 
improving the quality of “other item” exclusions, and reducing the frequency of these 
adjustments. Other items consist of earnings components other than those components 
identified by Compustat as “special items.” Thus, we focus our analysis on non-GAAP 
earnings with income increasing other item exclusions because we are specifically interested 
in examining how an improvement in non-GAAP reporting affects the relation between non-
GAAP earnings and crash risk. We use I/B/E/S actual earnings data (i.e., street earnings) 
covering both the pre- and post-Regulation G periods to conduct our difference-in-differences 
analysis. 
We focus the analysis on years 2001-2004, which comprises the two years before and 
after the regulation. We define our treatment group as firms with non-GAAP earnings that 
more frequently exclude income increasing other items during 2001 and 2002 (based on the 
median exclusion frequency for these items).23 By construction, these firms are more likely to 
have an improvement in the overall quality of their non-GAAP reporting because (1) the 
                                                          
23 We focus on this subsample with a relatively short window centered on Regulation G for two reasons. First, 
as Heflin and Hsu (2008) point out, a short-window test can help mitigate the potential confounding effects that 
tend to be larger in a longer-window test. Second, while Heflin and Hsu (2008) show that the use of non-GAAP 
earnings declines over the eight quarters after Regulation G, more recent studies show that the use of non-
GAAP reporting has since rebounded (e.g., Brown et al., 2012). The frequency of income increasing other item 
exclusions is the number of fiscal quarters in year t where I/B/E/S EPS excludes income increasing other items, 
divided by the four quarters in fiscal year t. We follow Hsu and Kross (2011) and measure other items 
conditional on the magnitude of total exclusions and the magnitude of the difference between operating income 
and GAAP earnings. 
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regulation helped curtail managers’ aggressive exclusion of other items (Heflin and Hsu, 
2008) and (2) other item exclusions that occur after the regulation are of higher quality, on 
average, than other item exclusions made before the regulation (Kolev et al., 2008). We 
define our control group as firms that do not exclude income increasing other items during 
2001-2004. We expect the decline in crash risk to be greater for the treatment group than for 
the control group after the regulation.   
Next, we use propensity score matching to identify firms in our control group that are 
most comparable to our treatment firms. We begin by using a Probit model to examine a 
firm’s likelihood of having more frequent non-GAAP reporting with income increasing other 
items exclusions (i.e., our treatment group) or not (i.e., our control group). We (1) use the 
control variables in Equation 2 as the independent variables in the Probit model, and (2) use 
the predicted probabilities from the Probit model to create our propensity score. We use this 
propensity score to match our treatment firms to a subsample of control firms so that we use a 
matched sample with minimal observable differences in firm characteristics.24 Appendix B 
illustrates the effectiveness of the propensity score matching process. Although differences 
between the two groups are significant for many variables before matching, most differences 
are insignificant after the matching, suggesting that our matching process is largely effective.  
After identifying our treatment and control firms, we estimate the following 
difference-in-differences model to examine whether treatment firms experience fewer future 
crashes after Regulation G than before, as compared with control firms: 
Crash Riski,t+1 = a0 + a1Treatmenti + a2Posti,t × Treatmenti  
+ anControls + ∑γtYeart + ∑wjIndj + ei,t, (4) 
   
where Post is equal to one for observations after the implementation of Regulation G (years 
2003 and 2004), and zero otherwise. Treatment is an indicator variable equal to one for 
                                                          
24 In particular, we match firms of the treatment and control groups via 1-to-4 nearest neighbor (a caliper width 
of 0.05) propensity score matching with replacement. We allow for the repeated use of control observations to 
increase the size of the matched sample and hence the testing power. 
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observations from our treatment group, and zero otherwise. Control variables are the same as 
in Equation 2, which we supress for presentation purposes. We present the results from 
estimating Equation 4 in Table 7. Of particular relevance, we first find that the coefficient on 
Treatment is positively significant, suggesting that the treatment group has a greater 
incidence of crashes than the control group prior to Regulation G.  Hence, our construction of 
treatment and control groups indeed properly captures the association between non-GAAP 
reporting and crash risk before Regulation G.  More importantly, we also find the coefficient 
on Post x Treatment is significant and negative across all four measures of crash risk 
(columns 1-4), consistent with a greater decline in crash risk for treatment firms than for 
control firms after Regulation G.  
We further partition the difference-in-differences design to identify when the effect of 
Regulation G affects the relation between non-GAAP reporting frequency and crash risk for 
treatment firms (columns 5-8). Specifically, we compare the matched sample by year, where 
Post +1 is 2004 (one year after Regulation G), Post 0 is 2003 (the year of Regulation G 
implementation), and Post -1 is 2002 (one year prior to Regulation G). The omitted year is 
2001, which is two years before the regulation and represents the baseline year for the 
interaction variables. Consistent with the assertion that the decline in crash risk is greater for 
the treatment group than for the control group after Regulation G, the interaction between 
Post and Treatment is significantly negative only after the implementation of Regulation G 
(i.e., Post 0 and Post +1), but not before. Importantly, these results corroborate the parallel 
trend assumption of our difference-in-differences design and further mitigate concerns that 
some endogenous relation is responsible for the results.  
6.2 The Long-term Implications of Crashes for Investors 
Finally, we examine the long-term implications for investors holding stock in non-
GAAP reporting firms that experience a crash. As previously discussed, Crash is an indicator 
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equal to one when a firm has an extreme negative weekly return during year t+1. Although a 
crash has negative return implications for equity holders during the week of the crash, it is 
unclear how far into the future these negative implications extend. For example, if the stock 
price rebounds in the weeks following the crash, then crashes expose investors to short term 
losses, but not longer-term losses. In contrast, if the negative price implications extend far 
into the future, then investors cannot mitigate the negative crash effects by simply holding the 
stock for a longer period of time. We conduct our analysis using the following model: 
BHARi,t+1 to t+n = a0 + a1NonGaapFreqi,t + a2Crashi,t  
+ NonGaapFreqi,t × Crashi,t + ∑anControls  
+  ∑γtYeart + ∑wjIndj + ei,t, 
 
(5) 
where BHAR t+1, t+n is the size-adjusted buy-and-hold return that starts in the year after the non-
GAAP reporting (year t+1). We examine three different return windows: one-year ahead, 
two-years ahead, and three-years ahead. We are particularly interested in the interaction 
between NonGaapFreq and Crash because it provides insight into the longer-term 
implications of crashes induced by non-GAAP reporting. Across all three return windows in 
Table 8, we find that the coefficient on the NonGaapFreq and Crash interaction is 
significantly negative and economically large. Thus, crash firms that frequently promote non-
GAAP metrics subject investors to extreme negative returns for up to three years after the 
non-GAAP reporting period. For example, results in column 1 show that crash firms that 
report non-GAAP earnings in each fiscal quarter of year t experience an on average return of 
-27% during the year of the crash (i.e., year t+1). These results indicate that the negative 
consequences from non-GAAP reporting crash firms affect not only active investors who 
hold their investments for short periods of time, but also more passive investors who hold 
their investments for years. 
 
 




We examine whether managers’ non-GAAP disclosures influence a firm’s crash risk. 
We find a positive relation between the frequency of managers’ non-GAAP reporting and 
crash risk. Moreover, this relation is attributable to instances where non-GAAP earnings 
exceed GAAP earnings. We also find that managers appear to use non-GAAP reporting as a 
substitute for the more traditional perception management tool examined in the crash risk 
literature, withholding bad news, as our evidence of an association between non-GAAP 
reporting frequency and crash risk concentrates among firms with a low level of bad news 
withholding. Our evidence also indicates that the non-GAAP reporting and crash risk relation 
concentrates in periods when aggressive non-GAAP reporting is more likely and for 
managers who are incentivized to inflate stock price. Our additional analyses indicate that our 
results are robust to an exogenous shock to non-GAAP reporting quality and that these 
crashes for non-GAAP reporting firms have long-run consequences for investors. In total, 
these results are consistent with a subset of managers aggressively reporting non-GAAP 
earnings to positively influencing investors’ assessments of firm performance, leading 
investors to overlook negative aspects of the firm and over-estimate the firm’s value. 
Our study adds to the prior research that examines the determinants of crash risk. The 
traditional view in the literature attributes crashes to managers’ ability to exploit their 
information advantage over investors by withholding bad news about firm performance. Our 
evidence suggests that managers withholding bad news is not necessarily required for crash 
risk to occur, and that crash risk can also occur through managers disclosing additional 
information about current performance. Furthermore, managers appear to trade-off between 
these two perception management tools. Finally, our study extends the literature on non-
GAAP reporting by providing evidence that non-GAAP earnings can have real negative 
impacts for capital markets. We are among the first to provide evidence that non-GAAP 
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earnings can expose investors to extreme negative economic outcomes that cannot be avoided 
by diversification.   
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Crasht+1 An indicator variable that equals one for a firm-year that experiences one or 
more crash weeks during fiscal year t+1 and zero otherwise. Crash weeks are 
defined as those weeks during which the firm experiences W with 3.2 
standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly return over the 
entire fiscal year.  
NSkewnesst+1 The negative coefficient of skewness of W over fiscal year t+1.  
LnDuVolt+1 The natural log value of DuVolt+1. DuVolt+1 is the ratio of the standard 
deviation of W for the down weeks to the standard deviation of W for the up 
weeks, where down and up weeks are those with W below and above, 
respectively, the mean over the fiscal year t+1. 
W Firm-specific weekly return, defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
residual return from estimating the expanded market model for each firm and 
each fiscal year:  
 
rj,ω = αj + β1,jrm,ω-2 + β2,jrm,ω-1 + β3,jrm,ω + β4,jrm,ω+1 + β5,jrm, ω+2 + εj,ω,  
 
where rj,ω is the return for firm j in week ω, rm,ω is the value-weighted CRSP return 
in week ω. For each firm and fiscal year, we estimate weekly returns throughout a 
12-month return window that ends three months after firm i’s fiscal year end. We 
define the firm’s specific weekly return (Wj,ω) as the natural log of 1 + εj,ω.  
 
Crash Compositet+1 A composite crash measure based on a principal component analysis on 
Crash, NSkewness, and LnDuVol. 
NonGaapFreqt The number of non-GAAP earnings reported, divided by the four fiscal 
quarters in fiscal year t. We identify a firm as reporting non-GAAP earnings 
if non-GAAP EPS from managers (Bentley et al., 2018) differ from GAAP 
EPS (i.e., total exclusions are not zero).   
NonGaapFreqNG>Gt The number of quarters with net income increasing total exclusions, 
resulting in non-GAAP EPS exceeding GAAP EPS, divided by the four 
fiscal quarters in fiscal year t. 
NonGaapFreqNG<Gt The number of quarters with net income decreasing total exclusions, 
resulting in non-GAAP EPS being less than GAAP EPS, divided by the four 
fiscal quarters in fiscal year t.  
MTBt The ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity at the end 
of fiscal year t. 
Leveraget Company debt scaled by the book value of total assets at the end of fiscal 
year t. Company debt is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities.  
ROAt+1 Income before extraordinary items in fiscal year t+1 divided by the book 
value of asset at the end of fiscal year t. 
Returnt The mean of W over fiscal year t. 
Sigmat The standard deviation of W over fiscal year t. 
ChgTurnovert The average monthly share turnover over the fiscal year t minus the average 
monthly share turnover over the fiscal year t-1, where monthly share 
turnover is calculated as the monthly trading volume divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding during the month. 
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DisAccrualst Discretionary accruals based on Modified Jones Model (1991) in fiscal year 
t. 
SqDisAccrualst Squared term of DisAccrualst. 
Yeart Indicator variables for fiscal years. 
Indj Indicator variables for industry membership based on Fama and French 
(1998) 48 industries.  
MktSentt The averaged value of sentiment index as defined by Baker and Wurgler 
(2006) over fiscal year t. 
FreqMBEt Number of firm-quarters in fiscal year t where non-GAAP earnings allow the 
firm to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts, divided by the four fiscal 
quarters in fiscal year t. We identify these meet-or-beat firm-quarters as 
observations where GAAP EPS < forecasted GAAP EPS (I/B/E/S GPS), but 
non-GAAP EPS (Bentley et al., 2018) ≥ forecasted EPS (I/B/E/S EPS). 
Deltat The minimum level of Delta among the executives available in Execucomp 
database of fiscal year t. Delta is the dollar increase in an executive’s wealth 
for a 1% increase in stock price.  
OpptunSalest The averaged dollar value of shares that are opportunistically sold by 
insiders over four quarters of fiscal year t. Opportunistic trades are defined 
as in Cohen et al. (2012). 
Treatment  An indicator variable equal to one for observations from our treatment 
group, and zero otherwise. 
Postt An indicator variable equal to one for observations after the implementation 
of Regulation G (years 2003 and 2004), and zero otherwise. 
Post x A set of indicator variables equal to one for the observations of a certain 
year, and zero otherwise. Post +1 is 2004 (one year after Regulation G), 
Post 0 is 2003 (the year of Regulation G implementation), and Post -1 is 
2002 (one year prior to Regulation G). 















Diff. Treatment Control 
Tests of 
Diff. 
NSkewnesst 0.155 0.080 
 
0.157 0.137 
 Sizet 7.123 6.281 *** 7.109 7.213  
MTBt 3.617 3.515 
 
3.628 4.228 * 
Leveraget 0.220 0.180 *** 0.221 0.230 
 ROAt+1 -0.021 0.024 *** -0.016 -0.003 
 Returnt 0.001 0.004 *** 0.002 0.002 * 
Sigmat 0.069 0.066 
 
0.068 0.065 * 
ChgTurnovert 0.306 0.335 
 
0.308 0.314 
 DisAccrualst 0.050 0.094 *** 0.053 0.051 
 SqDisAccrualst 0.027 0.038 * 0.024 0.024 
 
This table compares the mean values for variables in the treatment and control samples before and after PSM. 
Variable definitions are available in Appendix A. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.  
  




Non-GAAP Reporting Frequency and Stock Price Crash 
Panel A: Stock Price Crash Conditional on Total Non-GAAP Reporting Frequency 
 
Panel B: Stock Price Crash Conditional on Non-GAAP Reporting Frequency by Sign of Exclusions 
 
This figure presents the likelihood of having a crash in year t+1 (Crash) conditional on the level of non-GAAP 
reporting frequency in year t. Non-GAAP reporting frequency is measured as NonGaapFreq in Panel A and 























Frequency of Non-GAAP Reporting 
NonGaapFreqNG>G NonGaapFreqNG<G
NonGaapFreqNG>G NonGaapFreqNG<G 




Descriptive Statistics (N = 30,336) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Dependent Variables           
Crasht+1 0.223 0.416 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NSkewnesst+1 -0.064 1.017 -0.574 -0.106 0.392 
LnDuVolt+1 -0.052 0.417 -0.315 -0.065 0.198 
Crash Compositet+1 0.000 1.000 -0.609 -0.182 0.427 
Variables of Interest           
NonGaapFreqt 0.261 0.356 0.000 0.000 0.500 
NonGaapFreqNG>Gt 0.211 0.322 0.000 0.000 0.250 
NonGaapFreqNG<Gt 0.050 0.138 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Control Variables           
NSkewnesst -0.047 0.887 -0.542 -0.102 0.370 
Sizet 6.732 1.853 5.413 6.637 7.947 
MTBt 3.051 3.421 1.328 2.033 3.384 
Leveraget 0.185 0.173 0.024 0.152 0.294 
ROAt+1 0.010 0.141 0.003 0.031 0.072 
Returnt -0.002 0.007 -0.005 -0.001 0.002 
Sigmat 0.051 0.027 0.031 0.044 0.063 
ChgTurnovert 0.034 1.060 -0.291 0.007 0.325 
DisAccrualst 0.069 0.166 -0.011 0.032 0.124 
SqDisAccrualst 0.036 0.095 0.000 0.004 0.022 
            
This table reports summary statistics for variables used in our primary analyses. Variable definitions are 
available in Appendix A. 
  




Non-GAAP Earnings and Stock Price Crash Risk 
  Dependent Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Crasht+1 NSkewnesst+1 LnDuVolt+1 Crash Compositet+1 
NonGaapFreqt 0.101** 0.042** 0.018** 0.047** 
  (0.022) (0.024) (0.018) (0.011) 
NSkewnesst 0.081*** 0.050*** 0.022*** 0.051*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sizet 0.024** 0.028*** 0.011*** 0.024*** 
  (0.023) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MTBt 0.009* 0.004** 0.002** 0.005** 
  (0.055) (0.041) (0.021) (0.019) 
Leveraget -0.087 -0.084** -0.039** -0.080** 
  (0.361) (0.040) (0.018) (0.045) 
ROAt+1 -0.626*** -0.455*** -0.172*** -0.425*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Returnt 14.157*** 14.346*** 6.695*** 13.573*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sigmat 1.337* -0.782** -0.447*** -0.517 
  (0.082) (0.018) (0.001) (0.104) 
ChgTurnovert 0.025* 0.017*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 
  (0.054) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
DisAccrualst 0.339*** 0.077 0.033 0.109** 
  (0.004) (0.147) (0.109) (0.032) 
SqDisAccrualst -0.287 -0.156 -0.051 -0.144 
  (0.143) (0.101) (0.166) (0.111) 
N 30,336 30,336 30,336 30,336 
R2 0.026 0.025 0.030 0.028 
     
This table reports the relation between non-GAAP reporting frequency and stock price crash risk. Variable 
definitions are available in Appendix A. Constant terms, industry-, and year- fixed effects are included but not 
reported. We report z(t)-statistics based on robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity, which we also cluster at 
the firm level, in parentheses in column 1 (columns 2-4). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
  




Sign of Exclusions and Stock Price Crash Risk 
  Dependent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Crasht+1 NSkewnesst+1 LnDuVolt+1 Crash Compositet+1 
NonGaapFreqNG>Gt 0.145*** 0.064*** 0.027*** 0.071*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
NonGaapFreqNG<Gt -0.140 -0.070 -0.030* -0.075* 
 (0.202) (0.111) (0.098) (0.086) 
NSkewnesst 0.080*** 0.050*** 0.022*** 0.051*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sizet 0.024** 0.028*** 0.011*** 0.024*** 
  (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MTBt 0.009* 0.004** 0.002** 0.005** 
  (0.058) (0.043) (0.022) (0.020) 
Leveraget -0.089 -0.084** -0.039** -0.081** 
  (0.351) (0.038) (0.017) (0.043) 
ROAt+1 -0.626*** -0.455*** -0.172*** -0.425*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Returnt 14.272*** 14.403*** 6.719*** 13.635*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sigmat 1.314* -0.791** -0.451*** -0.527* 
  (0.087) (0.017) (0.001) (0.098) 
ChgTurnovert 0.026* 0.018*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 
  (0.050) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
DisAccrualst 0.353*** 0.083 0.036* 0.116** 
  (0.003) (0.116) (0.083) (0.022) 
SqDisAccrualst -0.294 -0.159* -0.053 -0.148 
  (0.134) (0.094) (0.154) (0.102) 
N 30,336 30,336 30,336 30,336 
R2 0.026 0.026 0.030 0.028 
F-tests (Chi-squared):     
NonGaapFreqNG>G = NonGaapFreqNG<G   
 5.62** 7.26*** 7.93*** 8.77*** 
     
This table reports the relation between non-GAAP reporting frequency and stock price crash risk conditional on 
the sign of net total exclusions. Variable definitions are available in Appendix A. Constant terms, industry-, and 
year- fixed effects are included but not reported. We report z(t)-statistics based on robust standard errors to 
heteroscedasticity, which we also cluster at the firm level, in parentheses in column 1 (columns 2-4). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
  




Non-GAAP Reporting and Bad News Withholding 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Crasht+1 NSkewnesst+1 LnDuVolt+1 Crash Compositet+1 
Par. Var. = DisAccrualst High  Low High  Low High  Low High  Low 
NonGaapFreqNG>Gt 0.004 0.165** 0.001 0.108*** -0.002 0.044*** -0.001 0.106*** 
  (0.962) (0.045) (0.972) (0.002) (0.912) (0.002) (0.989) (0.002) 
NonGaapFreqNG<Gt 0.163 -0.266 0.003 -0.194** 0.007 -0.077** 0.030 -0.182** 
  (0.352) (0.194) (0.967) (0.012) (0.827) (0.020) (0.710) (0.017) 
NSkewnesst 0.094*** 0.065** 0.061*** 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.017*** 0.060*** 0.037*** 
  (0.001) (0.027) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) 
Sizet 0.009 0.031* 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.023*** 0.026*** 
  (0.590) (0.079) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
MTBt 0.012* 0.015** 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.005* 0.006* 
  (0.089) (0.035) (0.150) (0.272) (0.162) (0.141) (0.095) (0.092) 
Leveraget -0.223 -0.086 -0.160** -0.045 -0.072** -0.023 -0.160** -0.048 
  (0.152) (0.594) (0.020) (0.495) (0.011) (0.394) (0.018) (0.456) 
ROAt+1 -0.647*** -0.448** -0.447*** -0.354*** -0.167*** -0.136*** -0.424*** -0.325*** 
  (0.001) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Returnt 16.740*** 11.572*** 14.725*** 13.240*** 6.741*** 6.354*** 14.229*** 12.447*** 
  (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sigmat 0.904 -0.121 -0.806 -1.015** -0.478** -0.470** -0.604 -0.812 
  (0.474) (0.925) (0.190) (0.046) (0.046) (0.022) (0.297) (0.102) 
ChgTurnovert 0.051** -0.016 0.028*** 0.003 0.010** 0.001 0.027*** -0.000 
  (0.021) (0.490) (0.007) (0.758) (0.010) (0.871) (0.005) (0.964) 
DisAccrualst 1.376*** 0.472 0.253 0.166 0.098 0.081 0.385* 0.216 
  (0.005) (0.166) (0.254) (0.299) (0.267) (0.194) (0.075) (0.160) 
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SqDisAccrualst -1.379** -0.009 -0.303 -0.137 -0.107 -0.025 -0.412 -0.069 
  (0.017) (0.985) (0.266) (0.565) (0.323) (0.781) (0.117) (0.758) 
N 10,092 10,133 10,092 10,133 10,092 10,133 10,092 10,133 
R2 0.021 0.029 0.017 0.034 0.020 0.039 0.019 0.035 
Tests of Diff. between High and Low:         
NonGaapFreqNG>Gt (p-value) (0.08) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
         
This table reports the relation between non-GAAP reporting frequency and stock price crash risk conditional on the level of accrual management. Variable 
definitions are available in Appendix A. Constant terms, industry-, and year- fixed effects are included but not reported. We report z(t)-statistics based on 
robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity, which we also cluster at the firm level, in parentheses in columns 1-2 (in columns 3-8). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
  





Panel A: Market Sentiment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Crasht+1 NSkewnesst+1 LnDuVolt+1 Crash Compositet+1 
Par. Var. = MktSentt  High  Low High  Low High  Low High  Low 
NonGaapFreqNG>Gt 0.266*** 0.115 0.136*** 0.036 0.059*** 0.018 0.145*** 0.047 
  (0.009) (0.146) (0.002) (0.272) (0.001) (0.181) (0.001) (0.155) 
Other variables:  Included Included Included Included 
N 7,938 11,726 7,938 11,726 7,938 11,726 7,938 11,726 
R2 0.030 0.030 0.019 0.024 0.024 0.027 0.024 0.026 
Tests of Diff. between High and Low:          
NonGaapFreqNG>Gt (p-value) (0.10) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
         
Panel B: Non-GAAP to Meet-or-Beat Earnings Forecasts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Crasht+1 NSkewnesst+1 LnDuVolt+1 Crash Compositet+1 
Par. Var. = FreqMBEt High  Low High  Low High  Low High  Low 
NonGaapFreqNG>Gt 0.203* 0.110 0.099* 0.045 0.038* 0.017 0.100** 0.049 
  (0.083) (0.127) (0.052) (0.156) (0.069) (0.187) (0.045) (0.121) 
Other variables: Included Included Included Included 
N 4,308 13,763 4,308 13,763 4,308 13,763 4,308 13,763 
R2 0.042 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.036 0.033 0.035 
Tests of Diff. between High and Low:          
NonGaapFreqNG>Gt (p-value) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
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Panel C: Sensitivity of Compensation to Share Price 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Crasht+1 NSkewnesst+1 LnDuVolt+1 Crash Compositet+1 
Par. Var. = Deltat High  Low High  Low High  Low High  Low 
NonGaapFreqNG>Gt 0.160* 0.005 0.129*** -0.029 0.052*** -0.007 0.120*** -0.017 
  (0.089) (0.962) (0.003) (0.528) (0.002) (0.731) (0.004) (0.714) 
Other variables: Included Included Included Included 
N 5,987 6,000 6,006 6,007 6,006 6,007 6,006 6,007 
R2 0.032 0.031 0.030 0.037 0.039 0.044 0.034 0.038 
Tests of Diff. between High and Low:          
NonGaapFreqNG>Gt (p-value) (0.05) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
         
Panel D: Opportunistic Insider Sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Crasht+1 NSkewnesst+1 LnDuVolt+1 Crash Compositet+1 
Par. Var. = OpptunSalest High  Low High  Low High  Low High  Low 
NonGaapFreqNG>Gt 0.170** 0.096 0.097*** 0.031 0.042*** 0.011 0.101*** 0.036 
  (0.025) (0.165) (0.003) (0.313) (0.002) (0.366) (0.002) (0.230) 
Other variables: Included Included Included Included 
N 10,112 17,654 10,112 17,654 10,112 17,654 10,112 17,654 
R2 0.031 0.028 0.024 0.034 0.029 0.038 0.029 0.036 
Tests of Diff. between High and Low:          
NonGaapFreqNG>Gt (p-value) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
 
This table reports the relation between non-GAAP reporting frequency and stock price crash risk conditional on the level of market sentiment (MktSent), frequency of using 
non-GAAP reporting to help meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts (FreqMBE), sensitivity of executive compensation to share price (Delta), and opportunistic insider sales 
(OpptunSales). Variable definitions are available in Appendix A. Constant terms, industry-, and year- fixed effects are included but not reported. We report z(t)-statistics based 
on robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity, which we also cluster at the firm level, in parentheses in columns 1-2 (columns 3-8). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
  





Sign of Exclusions Using I/B/E/S Data and Stock Price Crash Risk 
  Dependent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Crasht+1 NSkewnesst+1 LnDuVolt+1 Crash Compositet+1 
NonGaapFreqNG>Gt 0.155*** 0.049*** 0.020*** 0.059*** 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) 
NonGaapFreqNG<Gt -0.003 -0.014 -0.003 -0.009 
 (0.970) (0.613) (0.793) (0.734) 
NSkewnesst 0.081*** 0.050*** 0.022*** 0.051*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sizet 0.020* 0.027*** 0.011*** 0.023*** 
  (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MTBt 0.010** 0.005** 0.002** 0.005** 
  (0.033) (0.035) (0.017) (0.014) 
Leveraget -0.121 -0.091** -0.042** -0.091** 
  (0.209) (0.026) (0.011) (0.024) 
ROAt+1 -0.616*** -0.452*** -0.170*** -0.421*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Returnt 14.382*** 14.422*** 6.725*** 13.662*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sigmat 1.274* -0.800** -0.455*** -0.541* 
  (0.098) (0.016) (0.001) (0.090) 
ChgTurnovert 0.026* 0.017*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 
  (0.053) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
DisAccrualst 0.363*** 0.083 0.036* 0.117** 
  (0.002) (0.117) (0.086) (0.022) 
SqDisAccrualst -0.307 -0.162* -0.054 -0.151* 
  (0.119) (0.090) (0.148) (0.095) 
N 30,336 30,336 30,336 30,336 
R2 0.026 0.025 0.030 0.028 
F-tests (Chi-squared):     
NonGaapFreqNG>G = NonGaapFreqNG<G   
 4.35** 4.34** 3.49* 5.21** 
     
This table reports the relation between non-GAAP reporting frequency and stock price crash risk 
conditional on the sign of net total exclusions and using I/B/E/S data from 2003-2015 to identify non-
GAAP reporting. Variable definitions are available in Appendix A except that we replace non-GAAP 
EPS from managers with I/B/E/S Actual EPS. Constant terms, industry-, and year- fixed effects are 
included but not reported. We report z(t)-statistics based on robust standard errors to heteroscedasticity, 
which we also cluster at the firm level, in parentheses in column 1 (columns 2-4). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 




Difference-in-Differences Design around Regulation G using I/B/E/S Data 
  Dependent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Crasht+1 NSkewnesst+1 LnDuVolt+1 Crash Compositet+1 Crasht+1 NSkewnesst+1 LnDuVolt+1 Crash Compositet+1 
Treatment 0.812*** 0.237*** 0.089*** 0.273*** 0.952*** 0.280*** 0.109*** 0.332*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Post × Treatment -0.607** -0.245*** -0.085** -0.248***        
  (0.013) (0.002) (0.010) (0.003)        
Post -1 × Treatment        -0.306 -0.085 -0.040 -0.119 
         (0.450) (0.387) (0.375) (0.281) 
Post 0 × Treatment        -0.770** -0.312** -0.116** -0.333*** 
         (0.019) (0.012) (0.019) (0.007) 
Post +1 × Treatment        -0.726** -0.263** -0.094* -0.282** 
         (0.030) (0.017) (0.055) (0.019) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 12,142 12,160 12,160 12,160 12,142 12,160 12,160 12,160 
R2 0.114 0.084 0.092 0.088 0.115 0.084 0.092 0.088 
         
This table reports the relation between non-GAAP reporting and stock price crash risk using a difference-in-differences research design around Regulation G. Variable definitions 
are available in Appendix A. Constant terms, industry-, and year- fixed effects are included but not reported. We report z(t)-statistics based on robust standard errors to 
heteroscedasticity, which we also cluster at the firm level, in parentheses in columns 1 and 5 (columns 2-4 and 6-8). ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
  




Future Stock Return 
  Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  BHARt+1, t+1 BHARt+1, t+2 BHARt+1, t+3 
NonGaapFreqt 0.079*** 0.108*** 0.078*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
Crasht+1 -0.018* -0.015 -0.091*** 
 (0.086) (0.198) (0.000) 
NonGaapFreqt × Crasht+1 -0.270*** -0.319*** -0.302*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NSkewnesst -0.011* -0.002 0.046*** 
  (0.058) (0.825) (0.000) 
Sizet -0.010*** -0.009** 0.005 
  (0.000) (0.017) (0.394) 
MTBt -0.002** -0.006*** 0.032*** 
  (0.031) (0.002) (0.000) 
Leveraget 0.191*** 0.240*** -0.144** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) 
ROAt+1 0.844*** 0.848*** 1.669*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Returnt -10.474*** 70.774*** 60.575*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sigmat 2.470*** 6.192*** 6.043*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ChgTurnovert 0.005 0.015** 0.091*** 
  (0.132) (0.027) (0.000) 
DisAccrualst -0.109*** -0.120*** -0.226 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.223) 
SqDisAccrualst 0.059 0.079 0.903*** 
  (0.192) (0.236) (0.008) 
N 29,722 29,722 29,722 
R2 0.063 0.318 0.153 
 
This table reports the results from estimating the joint effect of non-GAAP reporting frequency and stock price 
crash risk on future stock return. Variable definitions are available in Appendix A. Constant terms, industry-, and 
year- fixed effects are included but not reported. We report t-statistics based on robust standard errors to 
heteroscedasticity, which we also cluster at the firm level, in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical 
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